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Keeping Ubiquitous Computing to Yourself: 
a practical model for user control of privacy 
Blaine A. Price1, Karim Adam, Bashar Nuseibeh 
Computing Research Centre, The Open University, MK7 6AA, UK 
Abstract 
As with all the major advances in information and communication technology, 
ubiquitous computing (ubicomp) introduces new risks to individual privacy. Our 
analysis of privacy protection in ubicomp has identified four layers through which 
users must navigate: the regulatory regime they are currently in, the type of ubicomp 
service required, the type of data being disclosed, and their personal privacy policy. 
We illustrate and compare the protection afforded by regulation and by some major 
models for user control of privacy. We identify the shortcomings of each and propose 
a model which allows user control of privacy levels in a ubicomp environment. Our 
model balances the user’s privacy preferences against the applicable privacy 
regulations and incorporates five types of user controlled “noise” to protect location 
privacy by introducing ambiguities. We also incorporate an economics-based 
approach to assist users in balancing the trade-offs between giving up privacy and 
receiving ubicomp services. We conclude with a scenario and heuristic evaluation 
which suggests that regulation can have both positive and negative influences on 
privacy interfaces in ubicomp and that social translucence is an important heuristic for 
ubicomp privacy interface functionality. 
 
Keywords: ubiquitous computing, privacy, legal, regulation, location-dependent and 
sensitive, pervasive computing 
1. Introduction, Motivation and Scope 
It is estimated that in 2005 there are some 2 billion mobile telephones in global use 
and RFID tags will be deployed in the billions by the end of the year (Lee, 2005). 
Mobile telephone handset capabilities range from being able to communicate with the 
network as a kind of dumb terminal using asynchronous text messages (GSM) to 
having embedded general purpose computers able to make video calls or transmit data 
at high speeds (GSM or UMTS SmartPhones). With mobile telephone penetration 
exceeding 100% in many areas of North America, Europe and the Far East, 
ubiquitous computing (ubicomp) has become a mainstream activity applicable to a 
sizeable population within developed countries.  
 
Every major advance in information and communication technology since the late 19th 
Century has raised new concerns about individual privacy. The consequences of 
ignoring these concerns have ranged from receiving unsolicited e-mail or telephone 
calls during dinner; to the deaths of hundreds of thousands in extermination camps 
(Black, 2001). The former has prompted a patchwork of regulation or self-regulation, 
while the later prompted many European countries to institute strong privacy (or data 
protection) laws.  
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Risks such as fraud and identity theft are so great, and such a significant proportion of 
the planet’s population is potentially affected, that user control of privacy protection 
in ubicomp is essential. Although data protection/privacy is not a new problem, 
ubicomp introduces a new privacy risk: timely and accurate location data for an 
individual (both real-time and historical) being made available. This paper concerns 
the new privacy risks created by this functionality and the risks of the release of 
personal information in a ubicomp setting offering Location Based Services (LBSs). 
Duckham and Kulik (2005) identify the risks of location data becoming public – both 
for real-time data (location-based spam and stalking), and for historical data (intrusive 
inferences about personal life, political view, or health).  
 
Others have demonstrated the need for explicit user control of privacy in ubiquitous 
computing (Bellotti & Sellen, 1993), and the complicated nature of user choice 
regarding what to disclose to whom in a networked world (Palen & Dourish, 2003). In 
this paper, we assume that users are aware of their privacy needs. We also assume 
they know to whom they wish to disclose personal data, or hide personal data from. 
Privacy sensitivity is highly individual both in the US (P&AB, 2003; Taylor, 2003) 
and in Europe (Dawson et al., 2003) ranging from “unconcerned” to “privacy 
fundamentalist”. Although others have attempted to guide users on their privacy risks 
(Ackerman & Cranor, 1999; AT&T, 2003) or suggest interface metaphors that 
encapsulate privacy preferences between one user and another (Lederer et al., 2002), 
we assume that the user has already made these choices. A user’s policy may have 
been generated in a number of ways; including choosing a representative template 
from a trusted third party (such as a consumer advocate) or from a community of 
peers providing suitable policies (Yee & Korba, 2005).  
 
Milberg et al. (Milberg et al., 1995) noted the general information systems 
relationships between nationality, cultural values, personal privacy concerns, and 
privacy regulation. In this paper we look at some of the differences in 
national/cultural values and the effect regulation has on ubicomp privacy interfaces. 
We are concerned with providing users with the necessary tools to protect their 
privacy in a global ubicomp environment.  
 
Our model is based on an analysis of the layers of control afforded to the user, who is 
located at the centre of our model (shown in extended form in Table 1). A user is an 
individual, identifiable human being. The user will have a variety of attributes, 
including a great deal of personally identifying information (PII). In our model, the 
PII forms a discrete layer surrounding the user.  
 
The types of services available to a ubicomp user with an explicit interface form the 
next layer outwards in our analysis. Since we are concerned with user control of 
privacy, we restrict our discussion to the class of active personal ubicomp devices 
which have an explicit user interface, such as a PDA or mobile telephone. Although 
we do not deny the importance of privacy for passive devices such as Active Badges 
or RFID tags, we do not discuss them here because of the lack of user control 
available. Since we are restricting our discussion to a subset of ubicomp devices, the 
available ubicomp services to consider is similarly constrained.  
 
Ubicomp interfaces, by their very nature, must be able to accommodate seamless 
movement between different regulatory regimes. A ubicomp interface must ensure 
  
that services comply not only with local laws, but also provide an appropriate level of 
privacy support based on the user’s privacy preferences wherever the local law is 
weak or nonexistent. It must also warn the user when local law requires a disclosure 
which violates the user’s privacy preferences. Therefore the regulatory regime for a 
given jurisdiction provides the outermost layer in both the privacy protection and 
service constraint in a ubicomp environment.  Lessig (1999) noted that privacy is 
dependent on four forces: law, market, norms, and architecture. The nature of 
ubicomp services is such that the architecture (the device in your hand) can remain 
constant, while the other factors may change depending upon where you are standing. 
 
In this paper, we do not consider the infrastructure being used by a ubicomp device to 
take advantage of LBSs. We use the terminology of Gunter et al. (2004) who identify  
holders as the principals in an infrastructure that collects location data or sightings. 
These sightings might be generated from a mobile telephone network using signal 
triangulation, a GPS tracking system, or accesses to short-range wireless network 
equipment (WiFi or Bluetooth) connected to the Internet. A subscriber in this case is 
a system or service that uses data collected by holders, as opposed to the traditional 
definition of the person using (or pay the airtime bill for) a mobile telephone. 
Although some of the scenarios and related work rely on a specific holder’s technical 
capability, we do not consider the detail of how a subscriber receives data.  
 
In the context of this paper, private data refers to data in digital form. Langheinrich 
(2002) extends his model of privacy protection in ubicomp to non-digital sources such 
as CCTV cameras that use wireless privacy beacons to advise users when their 
privacy is at risk. Although we believe this is a worthy goal, we believe that the 
differences in regulatory regimes and the proliferation of dense CCTV coverage 
(especially in the UK) make addressing this issue impractical at this time. 
 
Many of the principles discussed here may also be applicable when the user is part of 
an organization as opposed to a single identifiable human being; in this paper we 
restrict ourselves to the later definition. We regard organizational privacy as a security 
issue which can be regulated using contracts and agreements between institutions. 
 
The contribution of this paper is an analysis of the factors affecting user choices for 
control of ubicomp privacy. We consider both the architectural and legal implications 
and propose a model which incorporates them. Our model incorporates a number of 
types of “noise” to hide personal data and an economics-based model to help 
determine which data to reveal.  
 
In the following sections we examine each of the layers of our model moving outward 
from the user. In section 2 we examine types of personal data, both primary and 
derived, that are at risk in both conventional and ubicomp environments. Section 3 
examines the next layer; we classify the types of ubicomp services a user may might 
request and illustrate these services using scenarios. The various regulatory regimes 
form the outermost layer in protecting the user and regulating available services; we 
analyze and classify these in section 4. In section 5 we examine existing models that 
attempt to tackle the problem of protecting privacy in ubicomp. We compare the 
provisions of these models and attempt to identify their shortcomings. In section 0 we 
present a model incorporating regulatory regimes, privacy protecting noise, and an 
economics-based approach to revealing data. It assists a user in deciding which, if 
  
any, services to accept based on the appropriate regulatory regime, service, and type 
of data. We build on the economic utility model of Acquisti (2002). We discuss the 
use of privacy-protecting “noise” as an alternative to the release of personal 
information. We conclude by illustrating our model through a scenario and an 
evaluation incorporating a modified heuristic walkthrough. 
 
2. What is Personally Identifying Information? 
Personally identifying information (PII) is often subjective. There is usually some 
amount of information whose access requires control by their owners (subjects); PII 
can range from the identity of an individuals to their shopping habits. PII extends only 
those items that can be directly or indirectly linked to a single person (or in EU-speak 
a “natural person”) and does not include aggregated anonymous data. We use the term 
attacker to denote a person or organization who seeks to obtain PII without the 
consent of the owner. In order to consider what PII must be protected, we must first 
analyze the categories of data linked to an individual. Corby (2002) classifies private 
data into static, dynamic, and derived data. We present an extended version in 
Table 2. 
 
As the table shows, ubicomp sightings occupy the dynamic slot; adding one new data 
item composed of two parts: timestamp and location. This can be further divided by 
how data are used: either real-time (where the implied timestamp is “now”) or as a 
historical record. We note that dynamic/historical data are not a new privacy risk; it 
has been available through such mundane IT applications as credit card and telephone 
records. Ubicomp does, however, have the potential to provide far finer detail about 
one’s location with much greater temporal precision.  
 
It should also be noted that ubicomp implicitly occupies parts of the derived data 
category since analysis of location data over time can yield crucial PII to an attacker. 
This classification motivates our examination of ubicomp services in the next section. 
3. Classifying Ubicomp Services and Scenarios 
Until recently, the lack of actual ubicomp services available to the general public has 
meant that much of the work in ubicomp privacy has used hypothetical scenarios 
analyzed as case studies. In this paper, we re-use some of the popular scenarios which 
represent the range of activities available to a ubicomp user of a device with an 
explicit user interface. We classify them according to the type of data and how the 
service affects the user. We only consider scenarios where there is a privacy risk from 
data processing taking place beyond the user’s control. Therefore we do not 
investigate ubicomp services achieved entirely by computation on the user’s device. 
 
Gunter et al. (2004) present four scenarios similar to those found in other work: 
FriendsInTown.com, Market Models, What’s Here?, and Travel Archive.  
1. FriendsInTown.com is an alerting service allowing two people to register an 
interest in being notified when they are close to one another. As soon as the 
criterion is satisfied both users are informed. Similar scenarios proposed in 
other work also involve being interrupted by a ubicomp device once a 
location-based criterion is satisfied. These might include advertising 
  
notifications where a user is alerted as they approach a product on sale, or a 
form of semi-automated check-in as one enters an airport.   
 
2. Market Models provides historical information about characteristics of a group 
of users who satisfy a certain time/space criterion; such as the average income 
of everyone at Penn Station at noon on a given day.  
 
 
3. What’s Here? is typical of services which provide more detail to a user in 
response to a request about their present location. Examples include a list of 
forthcoming events in a  building, tourist points of interest (e.g. (Hong & 
Landay, 2004) among others), or the route to the nearest sushi restaurant 
(Duckham & Kulik, 2005).  
 
 
4. Travel Archive keeps a record of the datestamps and locations of people in 
order to answer queries like “where was I this time last year?” or “How many 
sales people did we have in the Birmingham area on Tuesday?” 
 
According to the data breakdown in Table 2 in the Dynamic section it is clear that 
FriendsInTown.com  and WhatsHere? Are both examples of Real-Time data, while 
MarketModelsI and Travel Archive rely on historical data. Ubicomp does not bring 
many new issues with respect to Dynamic Historical data other than the possible 
increased resolution of sightings. Access to and analysis of the data does not require a 
ubicomp device. For the Real-Time scenarios, there are clearly two types of service: 
Interupt-Based, where the user is alerted once certain criteria are satisfied, and Query-
Based, where the user asks for information based on their current location. 
4. Regulatory Regimes 
 “After a while you learn that privacy is something you can sell, but you can't 
buy it back.” – Bob Dylan (2004) 
 
US legal commentators began to consider privacy (“the right to be let alone” (Warren 
& Brandeis, 1985)) as a “natural law” or residual right in the late 19th Century. Their 
discussions were prompted by the rise of the newspaper industry which had been 
invigorated by the widespread use of photography. Their consensus was that the right 
to privacy had always been there but never formally incorporated in statute. Later 
Supreme Court decisions would suggest that the 9th and to some extent 3rd, 4th, and 5th 
amendments to the United States Constitution provided personal privacy protection. 
On the other side of the Atlantic, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) (1950) explicitly states that everyone has 
a right to privacy in private and family life (subject to some restrictions). 
 
In the mid 20th Century IBM's Hollerith punch card technology was used to collect 
census data which was later used by the Nazis to identify Jews for transport to 
extermination camps (Black, 2001). In the post-war era European countries codified 
strict privacy protection using both international treaties and national legislation. Most 
Western countries have followed suit, following OECD Guidelines (OECD, 1980) 
which are often cited as Fair Information Practices (FIP).  The United States is an 
  
exception to the strong legal protection of personal privacy; instead relying on a 
patchwork of laws (described below). 
 
As we will see in the next section, the different approaches taken between Europe and 
the US mirror two of the approaches for the protection of privacy in ubicomp. The 
European approach has been to consider PII alongside intellectual property; 
historically in the US most PII has been considered to be in the public domain once it 
has been revealed to one institution.  
 
Consider a situation in which an individual reveals a postal address to a business to 
process a specific request. The default position in the EU is that any other use, even 
within the organization, is implicitly forbidden. In the US and other less-restrictive 
regimes, one institution can sell mailing lists to another without obtaining the 
permission of the people on the list. Such lists can be sold and re-sold many times 
over, including composed data from spending patterns. This problem is probably what 
Bob Dylan had in mind in the quote at the beginning of this section. 
 
The ECHR was one of the first ‘Bill of Rights’ style documents to explicitly mention 
privacy as a fundamental human right.  Several of the larger European countries were 
early adopters of the OECD guidelines on privacy which effectively influenced the 
development of European Community law on data protection and privacy.  The 
ECHR is only enforceable against signatory governments (currently numbering 46); 
two pieces of EC legislation extend privacy protection to cover individuals and non-
governmental organisations. The first is Directive 95/46/EC (1995) which ensures that 
users have access to all of the data held about them; that data are only collected with 
the individual’s explicit consent, and that it is destroyed when it is no longer needed 
for the original purpose. The directive has possible consequences for location-aware 
computing. For example, as a user enters an area offering a service to which they 
would like to subscribe, does the user have to give explicit permission for the use of 
personally identifiable data for each new instance of the service? It is possible that the 
law may protect users, but is insufficiently flexible to allow them to effectively utilise 
the advantages of a technology.   
 
Fortunately, recent European law is anticipating some measure of technological 
change. The recent Directive 2002/58/EC (2002) is aimed at extending Directive 
95/46/EC to the telecommunications sector and makes explicit mention of location-
aware technology. Although the drafters of this directive were considering second- 
and third-generation mobile telephones, the directive prohibits the use of location 
information without explicit informed consent. Furthermore, the directive requires 
that equipment and service providers offer a simple free-of-charge method for users to 
temporarily hide their location information. This legislation also controls the use of 
cookies in web browsers. European privacy laws attempt to implement a kind of 
‘transitive closure’ whereby data may only be exported to another country possessing 
an equal data protection regime, or where the exporter has a special data protection 
contract with the importer providing equivalent protection to the directive. 
 
Japan is one of the countries with the greatest take-up of consumer-level ubiquitous 
computing (in the form of location-aware mobile telephones). It was one of the 
earliest countries to define privacy regulations for ubiquitous computing. This early 
level of market certainty resulted in increased business confidence and thus a wide 
  
proliferation of services. Similarly, thanks to well-established regulations consumer 
confidence in the new services was probably higher than it would be in a completely 
unregulated arena. 
 
Canada and Australia have also instituted strong privacy laws although without 
explicit attention to location-aware computing. Like the EU and Japan, each have 
Information/Privacy commissioners with the power to take both punitive and 
retributive action against privacy violations. 
 
In the US, a patchwork of legislation at both the state and national level provides 
privacy protection in certain narrow domains, including websites aimed at children 
(Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, 1998), financial sites (Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, 1999), health insurance sites (Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act, 1996), and certain baffling collections of data such as the records 
of videotape rentals (Video Privacy Protection Act, 1988). The data processing 
industry has provided heavy resistance to any form of privacy regulation; self-
regulation (e.g. TRUSTe (2004)) is promoted as an alternative, with virtually no 
mechanisms for redress of violations. Some US states have stronger privacy 
protection than others. When 145,000 consumer data profiles (including social 
security numbers) were stolen from the US data aggregator ChoicePoint in October 
2004, they were only obligated to notify the 35,000 Californians on the list because 
California is the only state to require notification of security breaches (Claburn, 
2005). 
 
Unlike other Western countries, the US does not possess a comprehensive national 
data protection law, and the closest equivalent to a national privacy commissioner is 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The FTC can take action against a business 
that violates its posted privacy policy under unfair trading regulations, but such 
violations are difficult to prove and the FTC has only acted in a very small number of 
cases. The most notable case was against GeoCities in 1998 (FTC, 1998) for 
misrepresenting the purpose for which it was collecting data from both adults and 
children. Despite several high profile violations of the TRUSTe standards by 
Toysmart (attempted), Microsoft (Office 98), and RealNetworks (RealJukebox) 
(Bronski et al., 2001), their TRUSTe certificate has never been revoked. Given the 
weak standards set for simple online privacy protection, there is no immediate 
prospect of legislation in the US either affording any privacy protection or 
impediment for location-aware computing. However, the regulations requiring mobile 
telephone networks to provide location information to emergency services (E-911 in 
the US, E-112 in Europe) are likely to affect how privacy enhancing technologies can 
be applied (see Table 1 for a classification of the four regulatory regimes).  
 
Ubicomp services obviously need to be aware of the current regulatory regime so that 
they can comply with it. Certain regimes require very explicit notice and consent. 
This will constrain how services are delivered. Users need to know that the level of 
protection they require personally will be maintained as they cross regulatory borders, 
some of which will be invisible. The very nature of ubicomp suggests that moving 
between regulatory regimes will be a common enough occurrence that this 
requirement must be supported. The complexity of the legal differences between 
regimes is such that the user should neither be expected to understand them, nor keep 
up with them as regulations change. We suggest in our model (section 0) that an 
  
understanding of the relevant regulatory regime be coded into a privacy protecting 
proxy; users need only express their own privacy policy for the appropriate action to 
be taken in a given regulatory regime. In the next section we examine how others 
have approached the automation of privacy protection in ubicomp. 
 
5. Related Work 
Before considering attempts to preserve user privacy in ubicomp, we first consider the 
simpler problem of privacy preserving mechanisms in traditional desktop computing. 
A common privacy risk in desktop computing is through the unintentional revelation 
of PII through a web browser. The only built-in protection for users in most web 
browsers is through restricting the automatic acceptance of cookies. Website privacy 
policies are written in natural language, making it difficult to perform automatic 
analysis of compliance with an individual’s privacy policy. Some attempts have been 
made to codify site privacy policies using XML to perform some measure of 
automatic analysis. The Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) was 
developed by World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) to integrate machine-readable 
privacy policies into web browsers (Cranor, 2002). P3P enables web browsers to 
automatically read privacy policies of web sites possessing appropriate XML tags; not 
all browsers are able to parse these tags and most websites do not post P3P polices. 
The AT&T Privacy Bird (AT&T, 2003) is an example of a browser plug-in that 
automatically compares a website’s P3P policy with the user’s own privacy 
preferences; it indicates green for a match, red for non-match, and yellow when no 
P3P policy is present. P3P version 1.0 has been criticized for its lack of enforceability, 
lack of relationship to existing legislation, and for failing to reflect Fair Information 
Policies (Electronic Privacy Information Center, 2000). P3P makes an assumption that 
companies own the data collected from visitors and make non-binding promises about 
how it will be used. 
 
The W3C has proposed a P3P Preference Exchange Language called APPEL so that 
users can own sets of policies for different situations and collect sets of complex 
policies from databases of trusted third parties (Cranor et al., 2002). Criticisms of P3P 
aside, the direction of this work is important because it acknowledges that individuals 
may require complex sets of privacy preferences covering a wide range of situations. 
Most people will rely on trusted third parties, such as consumer organizations, to 
suggest policy sets appropriate for them, a notion supported by Yee and Korba (2005) 
in their work on semi-automatic policy derivation and matching.  
 
Another promising development in the automated analysis of privacy requirements is 
IBM’s Enterprise Privacy Application Language (EPAL) (2003). EPAL is much more 
finely-grained than P3P and therefore has the potential to address some of P3P’s 
shortcomings. P3P is designed to present an enterprise’s very general privacy policy 
in machine-readable form to the outside world, while EPAL is designed to allow 
enterprise-internal relationships to be formalized and enforced. 
5.1. Privacy Models in Ubiquitous Computing 
Previous work aimed at helping ubicomp users protect their privacy, which generally 
means their location privacy, can be divided roughly into two groups:  
  
1. policy matching: attempts to provide mechanisms for comparing a user’s 
policy to that of the ubicomp service and notifies the user of mismatches, and; 
2. noise: tries to hide or disguise a user’s location or identity. 
 
We divide noise into five types: 
i. anonimizing: hiding the identity of the user; 
ii. hashing: disguising the identity of the user 
iii. cloaking: making the user invisible; 
iv. blurring: decreasing the accuracy of the location (and possibly time); and 
v. lying: giving intentionally false information about location or time. 
 
The Internet Engineering Task Force Working Group on Geoprivacy recently released 
an Internet-Draft (Schulzrinne et al., 2004) defining an XML schema for rules that 
match user requirements to geo-location requests. The current draft supports policy 
matching through a rich set of rules that permit users to grant or deny access to their 
location information. The schema also supports noise in the form of blurring, by 
permitting a user to specify the resolution of their location information. However, it 
does not support any other forms of noise and the complex nature of the XML schema 
underlines the suggestion of Yee and Korba above that effective user privacy policies 
can be extremely complicated and will require a great deal of support if they are to be 
at all manageable by consumers. 
 
Support for user control over personal privacy policies is provided by Lederer et al. 
(2002). Here, the authors note that ubicomp users may need different personal privacy 
policies at the same time depending on the recipient of the data. They use the 
metaphor of situational faces to allow a user to show an anonymous “face”, for 
example to retailers, while at the same time showing their “public” face to close 
friends (thus allowing a scenario like FriendsInTown.com to work). However, the 
problem of defining each of the complex ubicomp privacy policies still remains. 
 
Jiang et al. (2002) use an economics-based approach to analyze information flow in 
ubicomp. They have developed a model called approximate information flow. The 
model proposes a number of abstractions which try to minimize any imbalance 
between those who release their data and those who collect it. From an end-user 
perspective one of these abstractions classifies the methods of preserving privacy as 
prevention, avoidance, and detection. Prevention means not releasing PII if it could 
be mis-used, avoidance permits the release of PII but takes steps to try to prevent 
misuse; while detection is the process of sensing when mis-use has occurred. We also 
use these terms when looking at related work, and summarize our analysis in Table 3. 
 
One example of a commercial ubicomp system is AT&T’s Find People Nearby 
service (AT&T, 2004) which uses the conventional GSM/GPRS mobile telephone 
network. It allows users to register friends they would like to locate and obtains 
consent from each of those individuals. Once consent is obtained, the user can send a 
query which returns the location of a friend. A registered user may elect to flag 
themselves as unfindable or findable to others. This is a real-time query ubicomp 
system employing cloaking for privacy protection as a preventative measure. Many 
similar network-independent services are available in Europe. European law requiring 
notification and consent constrains the interface; users must send a text message each 
time they wish to turn tracking on or off. 
  
 
These systems illustrate a common concern about privacy problems in ubicomp: the 
departure from social norms. This information asymmetry was noted by Jiang et al. 
(2002); one person is allowed to know the location of another without the second 
person knowing that their personal information is being passed on. This is in contrast 
to a face-to-face interaction in which each person can see that they are being observed 
by the other.  
 
Hong and Landay (2004) identify a number of privacy requirements for end users, 
including simple and appropriate control and feedback. They address this concern in 
their Confab architecture by adding digitally signed privacy tags to shared data items. 
Privacy tags contain attributes such as TimeToLive (specifying retention time), 
MaxNumSightings (how much history should be kept), and Notify (allowing the data 
owner to know who has been looking at their information). In the event that the 
retention time is exceeded, or if data are disclosed without permission, or if the tag’s 
digital signature is invalid; then data can automatically be deleted or marked 
unreadable by the clients of an individual’s peers.  
 
Confab uses a privacy proxy to handle data requests and manage the user’s privacy 
policy so the actual ubicomp client is insulated. The Notify field supports the feedback 
requirement; it is possible for a data subject to know who has been looking at their 
data and how often. This important feedback element was also identified by Nguyen 
and Mynatt (2002) in their Privacy Mirrors system. 
 
Hong and Landay identify another end-user requirement in ubicomp privacy: 
plausible deniability, or, in plain English: ‘lying’. There are many situations where 
people rely on “white lies” or benign deception to avoid social embarrassment or 
simply to surprise a loved one. In one study, 88% of respondents said that they 
believed it was acceptable to deceive a person if it was in that person’s best interest 
(Sokol, 2004). Hong and Landay’s Confab satisfies these desires by returning 
“Unknown” when a data request violates a user’s set privacy policy or by returning a 
preset value if the user wishes to lie.  
 
This approach corresponds to the European data protection model of data being 
licensed for a specific purpose and no other. The idea of combining data with 
metadata in Confab is similar to one form of Digital Rights Management (DRM) 
approach where music playback software enforces the number of licensed devices on 
which a piece of music may be played. Langheinrich (2002) proposed using metadata 
in his privacy awareness system (pawS). Like Confab, pawS makes use of a privacy 
proxy. It matches user privacy policies with those advertised by ubicomp services 
using P3P and APPEL and allows the user to accept or decline if there is a mismatch. 
 
The DRM approach to privacy is typified by the work of Gunter et al. (2004) who 
combined a method using a formal access control matrix with Personal DRM 
(PDRM). Their  PDRM system combines the features of P3P with the eXtensible 
rights Markup Language (XrML) (ContentGuard.com, 2005) to create digitally signed 
contracts licensing the use of personal data for specific purposes and for fixes periods 
of time. PDRM uses a geographic information server to enforce contracts in much the 
same way as Confab and pawS use a proxy to hide the real ubicomp user. PDRM 
requires prospective subscribers to submit digitally-signed privacy policies which are 
  
compared with individual users’ policies and either accepted or rejected on an as-
needed basis. 
 
Other approaches to protecting privacy have focussed on using ‘noise’ to protect 
location information. Gruteser and Grunwald (2003) expand the uncertainty of the 
location of a single user to a cover an area that includes a number of other users, thus 
making them anonymous within the group. Duckham and Kulik (2005) give a false, 
but nearby location, instead of the actual location of the user. Beresford and Stajano 
(2003) show how the identity of a user can be protected by hashing it to a frequently 
re-named pseudonym using a proxy.  
 
Each of these methods is designed to balance the need between privacy protection and 
the quality of service provided to the user. Each is intended to prevent the subscriber 
from gathering too much private information about a subject, and to prevent an 
attacker from gleaning sufficient information to track subjects without their 
knowledge or consent. Table 3 shows a comparison of the major ubicomp privacy 
models against our framework. 
 
 
5.2. The Economics of Privacy 
The systems discussed in the previous section use the techniques of prevention 
(refusing to use services that will release PII the user does not wish to release) and 
avoidance (using noise to minimize the risk of actual PII being released). In the case 
of a service which requires more PII than the user is willing to reveal, the service will 
be rejected by the privacy proxy. The ultra-paranoid user who chooses to reveal no 
PII to anyone will find few if any services available, making the ubicomp device 
almost useless to that user. What is missing is a tool that helps a user analyze potential 
risks and balances them against their needs. 
 
Economists have studied privacy for some time (Posner, 1978) and have expanded the 
relatively simple concept that privacy protection represents a trade-off between the 
benefits of sharing PII and its associated costs. In terms of ubicomp, the benefit from 
releasing one’s current location or other PII, is the receipt of a service. The value of 
the benefit may be outweighed by the present or future cost of unknown “attackers” 
being able to track you. Using a Privacy Enhancing Technology (PET) will have some 
cost (monetary, in functionality, or perhaps a lower quality of service in the case of 
blurring) which must be subtracted from the benefit received from the service. The 
lack of a service may also have a cost in terms of convenience or necessity (e.g. if you 
need cash urgently and need to find the nearest cash machine).  Some trade-offs will 
be less clear; for example, if you allow a merchant to see your buying patterns then it 
can send you highly targeted ads or offers, thus reducing the amount of irrelevant 
material you have to process. The merchant could also use this information to your 
detriment: if your shopping patterns show what you are willing to pay for certain 
items, some merchants may charge you a higher price because they know you are 
likely to pay it (Rosencrance, 2000). Acquisti (2002) shows that this course of action 
is not in the best interests of the merchant, but it is impossible for users to know if 
they are the victim of discriminatory policies.  
 
  
Acquisti’s (2004) analysis of consumer behaviour indicates that consumers are 
unlikely to act rationally (in a privacy sense); self-proclaimed privacy advocates are 
prepared to give up personal information for relatively small rewards. He shows how, 
with the economics of immediate gratification, even sophisticated users become 
“privacy myopic.” Pre-set privacy policies can help prevent privacy myopia, but there 
is a clear need for tools to help users come to rational decisions about privacy. 
6. A Practical Model for User Control of Privacy 
In our four layer model of ubicomp privacy issues, the outermost layer represents the 
regulatory regime while the innermost layer is composed of  users and their personal 
privacy policies (see Table 1). We assume that the user’s policy is coded (perhaps in 
geopriv’s XML schema (Schulzrinne et al., 2004) or some other method), and has 
been defined for a variety of recipients (perhaps using a faces metaphor as suggested 
by Lederer et al. (2002)). We assume that the ubicomp device gathers its own location 
information by some means (such as connecting to a network provider or from an 
integral GPS or some combination of methods). Location data are transmitted to a 
trusted privacy proxy. As with the Confab and pawS systems, the proxy handles all 
requests from subscribers and has access to each user’s current privacy policies. 
Figure 1 shows the layout of the model. 
 
We chose to extend Hong and Landay’s (2004) Confab architecture in our model for a 
number of reasons: 
1. using a proxy allows a broad range of noise (i.e., anonymising, hashing, 
blurring, cloaking, and lying) to be employed and removes computational 
load from the ubicomp device, thus allowing the user to have a richer 
privacy policy; 
2. including a notify tag in the metadata allows enforcement of user feedback 
requirements (knowing you are being watched and discouraging 
overzealous spying); 
3. since the proxy knows the user’s current regulatory regime it can: 
• apply appropriate regulations when accessing services such as 
notice and consent on behalf of the user; 
• balance the current regulatory protection with the user’s personal 
policy; if the former is stricter than the latter then the user can 
access services directly, if the latter is stricter it can apply 
appropriate techniques before the user can accesses services; 
• warn the user if the regularatory regime requires release of PII in 
violation of the user’s policy (e.g., E-911 or E-112); 
4. digitally signed metadata attached to PII allows a broad range of 
enforcement techniques, including a community of peers. 
The first two reasons above support the concept of Social Translucence (Erickson et 
al., 2002) upon which we elaborate below. The third reason supports our notion that 
the regulatory regime is tightly interconnected with the enforcement of the user’s 
privacy preferences. The final reason is included to provide the user with a 
trustworthy mechanism for ensuring and enforcing privacy (encryption and digitally 
signed metadata). 
 
In our model, the proxy not only acts on behalf of the user in sending (or not) location 
information to a subscriber, but it also acts on behalf of users when they access the 
  
features of the service. Some regulatory regimes have explicit requirements for how 
notice and consent is given. Since the proxy always knows the location of the user, it 
is able to apply the appropriate regulations and ensure interface compliance. The 
proxy’s knowledge of the local regulations also allows it to compare the user’s policy 
with local regulatory protection and either rely on this or provide additional protection 
through noise as necessary. 
 
This proxy permits all five types of privacy-protecting noise to be applied in 
situations where the user does not wish to be interrupted by certain classes of person 
or organisation. In particular, it allows a user to lie to other subscribers according to 
their policy settings whilst still complying with local regulations. 
 
We also adopt the PDRM approach of Gunter et al. (2004) which creates digitally-
signed licenses or contracts for the use of data wherever possible (if the service 
provider allows and a public key infrastructure is present). In regulatory regimes 
lacking strong legal protection for privacy the user still has enforceable civil redress 
against privacy theft in the same manner that music companies have redress for 
copyright violations. This is compatible with Lessig’s view of the influence of laws 
and norms on privacy, and mirrors his use of copyright law to license media in the 
Creative Commons (2005). 
 
The final element of our model provides users with the tools necessary to adjust their 
privacy level in a rational way in the event of a conflict between their privacy policy, 
a regulation, and a required service. Our model incorporates Acquisti’s (2004) utility 
model for measuring the potential benefit of the release of PII against the possible 
costs. Acquisti’s utility equation is a complex function of five variables, some of 
which are composed of multiple factors and some of which are probabilities (for 
example; data misuse). In our analysis above we noted that users cannot know in 
advance if a merchant will use their PII to enhance the users’ experience or use that 
information against them in non-competitive pricing. In order to measure the 
probability of either of these events, we incorporate a third-party database of trust in 
organizations. This could be provided by independent consumer advocates who are 
able to regulate a merchant’s trust rating based on consumer reports and from their 
own investigations.  
 
This model provides a tool for making rational decisions based on actual versus 
perceived risk. It would prove particularly useful in situations where consumers 
require immediate gratification, or where they need to decide whether or not to relax 
their privacy constraints to receive a service. The next sub-sections presents a 
scenario to illustrate our model followed by an evaluation using a modified heuristic 
walkthrough using the scenario. 
 
6.1. Scenario 
Section 3 introduced a number of typical ubicomp scenarios from the literature. Here 
we illustrate our model by following the travels of an imaginary ubicomp user, Bob, 
through these scenarios along with some extensions. 
   
Bob has programmed his ubicomp device to upload his location to a trusted privacy 
proxy server at five-minute intervals. This traffic is encrypted, so even if his ex-
  
girlfriend Eve, was listening to network traffic she would be unable to decrypt his 
location data. Bob stores a number of privacy policies on the privacy proxy. These 
policies relate to individuals, classes of individuals and organizations. Many of these 
policies are triggered by his location and the time of day.  
 
For example, during the working day Bob’s policy provides location data to his 
partner, Alice, his work colleagues and his children’s school. Each of them can send 
an explicit request to a service like FriendsInTown.com provided Bob has an account 
with the company and has previously authorized them to have access. When a request 
is sent from FriendsInTown to Bob’s privacy proxy, the proxy applies a policy that is 
appropriate for the time of day and requestor.  
 
Assuming the proxy approves the issue of data, Bob’s information is tagged with 
metadata indicating an appropriate retention time. The data are then encrypted and 
transmitted to FriendsInTown. The entire transaction is then logged by the proxy for 
later examination and for legal purposes. 
 
An attacker (stalker) may gain some measure of access to Bob’s location data by 
stealing a private key belonging to one of Bob’s friends. They could then make 
repeated requests to build up a profile of his movements. Bob would be informed of 
this when his proxy reports that a friend is taking an overkeen interest in his 
movements. 
 
Bob is partially protected from accidental or intentional re-forwarding of his location 
information by an authorized recipient. Suppose Bob’s daughter has been taken ill; 
the temporary secretary at his daughter’s school sent a location request to find Bob 
and subsequently accidentally forwarded the data to a third party. The signed 
metadata would indicate that the data had expired and that the unauthorized recipient 
was not on the original recipient list. The final recipient’s computer should either 
automatically delete the data or at least refuse to read it (in the same way that one 
person’s purchased digital music cannot be played on another person’s player). 
 
Bob has control over the location data issued by his proxy, therefore he has roughly 
the same ability to commit benign deceptions as he did before his movement was 
monitored. By instructing the proxy to utilize a noise effect (such as blurring) he 
could choose to take an extra long lunch rather than visit a nearby client. Even if his 
boss used a TravelArchive service to look at Bob’s location history it would simply 
indicate he was in the area. Bob might explicitly lie about his location if he wishes to 
surprise Alice and didn’t want her to know he had been in a jewellery store. As with 
conventional deception there are risks, but anecdotal evidence as well as some ethics 
research (Sokol, 2004) indicates that people must be able to lie at times. 
 
Most of Bob’s privacy needs can be satisfied by a set of predefined policies that are 
activated by the time of day or his location; so, other than for secret trips to the 
jewellery store, he does not need to change his privacy profile.  
 
When the work day is over, Bob’s colleagues no longer have access to his location 
data but close friends might automatically be granted access. Bob may want to be 
advised when GadgetsRUs have a sale on accessories for his ubicomp widget. He can 
  
enable certain advertising interrupts that will be activated when he visits a shopping 
mall. 
 
Upon entering the shopping mall he might be informed that MarketModels would like 
to collect information about his movement around the mall, in exchange they will 
offer him discounts at certain stores. How would he know if this would be worth 
doing?  
 
Bob can ask his privacy proxy to make an assessment of the costs and benefits of 
completing the MarketModels survey. It will apply an economic utility model to 
Bob’s situation. For example, the proxy’s utility model might calculate that Bob was 
likely to save an additional $100 over the next few if he used the discounts. The proxy 
must then offset these savings against the risks involved; MarketModels privacy 
policy claims they will anonymize Bob’s data after collection. The proxy then checks 
MarketModels’ entry in the Online Consumers Association database to determine the 
probability of them honouring their policy. Finally, the proxy offsets the relevant risk 
calculations against the projected savings. With all of this information, the proxy can 
give informed advice to Bob; either that he should accept the offer and benefit from 
the projected savings, or, that he should decline since the risk from MarketModels 
exceeds Bob’s comfort level. 
 
Bob enjoys adventure holidays and decides to take his vacation in the recently 
democratized Republic of Elbonia, which claims to host eight of the seven wonders of 
the world, but has very little formal privacy legislation. The only travel advice 
application available to his ubicomp device is ElboniaNow, an equivalent to the 
WhatsHere? Tourist advice application. Bob’s location and other data are not at risk; 
his privacy proxy recognizes Elbonia’s lax privacy regulation and restricts itself to 
sending anonymous information to ElboniaNow. 
 
If Bob has to provide additional PII to take advantage of another service in Elbonia 
(even if the economic utility model advises him against it), then he will have some 
protection from ordinary civil contract law if his personal data was sent with a PDRM 
license attached to it. 
 
6.2. Evaluation 
The evaluation of ubicomp models and interfaces is often hampered by the lack of 
user experience of the technologies, combined with the fact that the technologies are 
not fully implemented.  Privacy and security interface problems, especially for 
novices, are well documented (e.g., Whitten & Tygar, 1999). This has lead to a 
preference for heuristic evaluations allowing experts to take the role of users. We 
chose a heuristic walkthrough because some studies (e.g., Po et al., 2004) have shown 
that heuristic walkthroughs are more effective at evaluating ubicomp interfaces than 
traditional heuristic evaluations because the use of scenarios allows the inclusion of 
vital contextual information in scenarios. 
 
6.2.1. Method 
Our pool of evaluators included three senior HCI academics (including one co-author 
of a major HCI textbook) and two mature final-year HCI PhD students each with 
  
several years of HCI experience in industry. All are long term EU residents (UK, The 
Netherlands, Greece) with complete fluency in English. We interviewed each asking 
about their use of store loyalty cards and e-commerce shopping activity to determine 
which of the three major privacy segmentations they fall into (unconcerned, 
pragmatist, or fundamentalist from the Westin/Harris Privacy Segmentation Model 
(Taylor, 2003)). One academic was clearly in the fundamentalist end of the spectrum 
while the others were privacy pragmatists, although one of the other academics had 
some fundamentalist leanings. We selected two of the academics, a fundamentalist 
and a pragmatist, to act as consultants on the study design and help choose the 
heuristics for the others to employ. This allowed us to get two independent 
perspectives covering a range of  privacy perspectives. They settled on the following 
six heuristics: 
• Visibility of system status  
• User control and freedom  
• Error prevention  
• Flexibility and efficiency of use  
• Help users recognize, diagnose, and recover from errors  
• Social Translucence 
 
The first five are chosen from Neilson’s (1994) original ten. The last heuristic 
encapsulates the notion of how well the interface supports social norms in 
communication. We believe that the revelation (or hiding) of one’s personal 
information to others in a ubicomp setting is simply a specialized case of CSCW. 
Erickson et al. (2002) coined the term Social Translucence to describe CSCW system 
design which allows users to draw on their social experience and expertise to structure 
interactions with each other. 
 
In our evaluation, we sought to compare three models of ubicomp privacy control: the 
standard commercial implementation on mobile telephones in Europe used by dozens 
of providers to comply with EU law, the Confab model (Hong & Landay, 2004), and 
our extension to the Confab model. Since a standard heuristic walkthrough would be 
difficult without implanted or equivalent mocked up interfaces, we followed a 
modified version designed in consultation with our two experts. They noted that in 
contrast with a traditional heuristic walkthrough where working interfaces or mock 
ups were used, we wished to test how well the functionality of a model supported the 
ubicomp heuristics. The method chosen included a standard presentation of each of 
the three models to the evaluators, including the scenario presented above in 
subsection 6.1. The models were presented using a written description combined with 
some static images along with an animated demonstration using Topiary (Li et al., 
2004), a tool for prototyping location-enhanced applications using hand-drawn mock-
ups and story boards supporting Wizard of Oz techniques. We asked each evaluator to 
follow a think-aloud protocol as they worked through each scenario for each model 
and considered each heuristic. We took verbatim field notes for each. Once the 
evaluator had considered all three models and their questions were answered, we 
asked them to rank each model’s compliance with the heuristics on a 1 (least) to 5 
(most) Likert scale. The results appear in Table 4. 
 
  
6.2.2. Results 
Each of the evaluators’ scores across each of the models and heuristics appears quite 
consistent. As one might expect, the simple GSM mobile telephone interface (which 
complies with EU privacy law and is in wide use commercially) was ranked at the 
bottom of the scale on all the heuristics. This model has a clunky asynchronous 
messaging interface providing an all or nothing option on revealing the user’s location 
and no feedback to the users as to when or how often they were being “watched”. 
Two of the three evaluators made explicit reference to this social translucence aspect 
in their qualitative comments (e.g. “I wouldn’t know how many people were checking 
up on me”). 
 
The higher scores for Confab and our proposed extensions are also not surprising, 
although we were surprised at the lower score for error prevention in the Confab 
extension. The evaluators stated that the richer functionality and rules provided by the 
extensions also created a potentially confusing interface with complex rules which 
were prone to user error. Our model showed the highest score for social translucence 
and comments from evaluators indicated that this was likely to engender more trust in 
the technology by users (“it’s less like a one-way mirror and more like a window”). 
 
6.2.3. Discussion 
The simple design of the current standard interface in Europe for user control of 
privacy complies with the strong EU privacy regulations. EU legislators were clearly 
trying to strike a balance between privacy protection and compatibility with existing 
technology but the result is an interface with poor user support for privacy control. 
Strong regulation has, however, resulted in widespread deployment of the technology 
across all GSM providers. Similar clear legislation in Japan has resulted in a very 
wide deployment of location-based technologies while other countries without clearly 
defined regulation in this area lag behind. 
 
The low score for error prevention in the Confab extension supports our earlier 
contention that effective ubicomp privacy policies for users are too complex for 
ordinary users and that a community of peers or consumer advocate groups will be the 
likely repositories of generic privacy polices that users may adopt as their default. The 
much higher score for social translucence in the Confab extension combined with the 
evaluators’ comments suggest that allowing user feedback on location requests is 
important. This is supported by recent work investigating social context of location 
disclosure (Smith et al., 2005). While scenario based heuristic evaluations provided 
valuable initial data regarding the value of our model, additional usability studies 
employing members of the anticipated user community need to be performed in the 
future. 
 
6.3. Future Work Implications 
Our study focussed on European users and experts who are used to strong privacy and 
consumer protection laws. Most previous user studies of privacy segmentation 
(Sheehan, 2002; Taylor, 2003) and location disclosure (Consolvo et al., 2005) have 
focussed on US users where privacy protection is relatively weak. Since regulation 
can constrain privacy interfaces, our next study will attempt to extract the privacy 
  
requirements of European users. This will allow us to compare US and European 
attitudes toward privacy to determine if strong regulation results in users perceiving a 
lower privacy risk and will give us an indication of the effects of Laws and Norms on 
user privacy requirements. 
 
Our evaluation, while limited in scope and applicability, highlighted the importance 
of social translucence in ubicomp and it noted a significant interaction between 
regulation and functionality of a privacy interface in ubicomp. Strong privacy 
regulation combined with limited technology functionality has resulted in an interface 
with poor support for user control of privacy. Paradoxically, the legal protection of 
the user has resulted in the user having inadequate control over their privacy. 
However, with the expected widespread take-up of third generation mobile telephony 
(UTMS) in Europe in 2005 there is an opportunity to provide a richer privacy 
interface and it will be interesting to note if either the legislators or the interface 
designers take advantage of this. 
 
The remaining societal forces affecting user privacy requirements are Market and 
Architecture. With the deployment of third generation mobile telephony (UMTS) 
becoming widespread in Europe (Lee, 2005) there is a unique opportunity to influence 
the Architecture and therefore the Market of the de facto ubicomp device for ordinary 
users. We will be testing our proposed model with real users using mock-ups and 
implemented prototypes using subsets of features on GSM platforms. These tests 
should allow us to refine our design to allow a UMTS implementation that is capable 
of supporting a powerful privacy interface. 
 
An important issue that we are not addressing is the interface for user selection and 
control of complex privacy policies which is clearly crucial to consumer protection. 
Ease of use for this kind of interface is crucial if adequate consumer protection is to 
be achieved. One solution will be for trusted third parties to design generic privacy 
solutions and pre-package those in such a way as to make it easy for users to select a 
policy set appropriate for them. Another would be to provide a questionnaire-based 
tool to help users determine their privacy needs. 
 
7. Summary 
Many surveys have demonstrated consumer concerns about privacy in ordinary 
desktop computing. Ubicomp promises to bring many consumer benefits, but it 
magnifies existing privacy concerns. Widespread adoption at a societal level will 
require strict attention to the societal forces acting on privacy: Laws, Norms, Market, 
and Architecture. Our model addresses each of these factors. We encode relevant laws 
so that the privacy proxy can manage both protection and compliance. We address 
societal norms, thus supporting social translucence, in two ways: 
• by allowing five forms of privacy-protecting noise, we allow people to control 
when and how they are visible to others, and by supporting lying we ensure 
that existing societal behavior patterns are not disallowed by technology; and 
• by ensuring that access to location data is logged (so users can see who is 
watching them), we support feedback to correct the asymmetry introduced by 
making such location data available. 
 
  
In this paper we have highlighted the additional privacy risks in ubicomp. We 
analyzed previous work in the context of our characterization of the data, services, 
and regulations affecting user privacy. From the analysis we combined and extended 
previous approaches in order to address the new privacy needs in a flexible and 
comprehensive way and identified a number of rich areas for further exploration. 
Ultimately, ubicomp take-up by users depends on privacy protection being both 
trusted and usable. By providing a model that protects users from the invasiveness of 
both the technology and other people we believe we are taking an important step 
along this road. 
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Table 1: Four Layer Model of UbiComp Services 
User 
Data 
Dynamic Derived 
Static 
Historical Real-time Analysed Composed 
 UbiComp Services   
 Query Interrupt   
Regulatory Regimes 
States with little to no privacy protection in law 
States with some protection (e.g. USA) 
States with strong privacy protection (e.g Canada, Australia) 
States with strong privacy protection including location aware (e.g. EU, Japan) 
 
 
  
Table 2:Taxonomy of Data Types and Examples based on (Corby, 2002) 
Type of Data Sub-Type & Example 
Offline 
1. Bio-identity: fingerprints, race, colour, gender, 
height, weight, physical characteristics, retinal 
pattern, DNA 
2. Financial identity: bank accounts, credit card 
numbers 
3. Legal identity: government ID numbers (SSN, 
Passport #, Driver’s Licence) 
4. Social identity: membership in church, auto clubs, 
ethnicity 
5. Relationships: child of, parent of, spouse of 
6. Real Property Associations: home address, 
business address 
Identity 
Online 
Digital ID: pseudonym, E-mail address, Username, IP 
address, Password 
Tangible 
Property: buildings, automobiles, boats, mobile phones 
Personal Worth: credit balances, stock portfolios, debt 
balances 
Static 
Assets 
Intangible Non-real property: insurance policies, employee 
agreements 
Historical 
Low Resolution: Transactions: financial, travel, mobile 
phone records 
High Resolution: UbiComp Sightings log (Time, Place) Dynamic 
Real-Time UbiComp Sightings ([Now], Place) 
Analyzed 
Data derived by analyzing trends over time 
Financial behaviour 
1. Trends and changes: month-to-month variance 
against baseline 
2. Perceived response to new offerings: matched with 
experience  
Social behaviour 
Behaviour statistics: drug use, violations of law, family 
traits 
Tastes 
Buying patterns: purchase of item in a certain class 
suggests desire to buy other items in same class 
Derived 
Composed 
Linking Data about person to other data 
1. DNA analysis: DNA linked to human genome 
database infers tendency to disease, psychological 
behaviour 
2. Multi-Data linking:  e.g. knowing a device with a 
given MAC address was seen at a given place/time 
and knowing that the number is registered to a 
person infers person was at place/time 
 
  
Table 3: Comparison of Privacy Protecting Models in UbiComp 
Author(s)/ 
System Name 
Description Type of 
privacy 
protection 
Real-
time? 
Historical? Method of 
protecting 
privacy 
1. (Duckham & 
Kulik, 2005) 
Location blurring to nearby 
point 
Preventive 
 
X   Noise (Blurring) 
2. (Gruteser & 
Grunwald, 
2003) 
k-anonymity  
Preventive  X 
Noise 
(Blurring/Anonymity) 
3. (Beresford & 
Stajano, 2003) 
Provides unlinkability 
between pseudonyms 
Preventive 
 X Noise (hashing) 
4. (Hong & 
Landay, 2004) 
Confab 
Privacy proxy handles 
digitally signed privacy 
metadata 
Avoidance, 
Preventative X X 
Matching Policies, 
Noise(Cloaking, 
Lying) 
5. (Langheinrich, 
2002) 
Privacy Awareness 
System (pawS) 
Use of : 
• privacy proxy 
• privacy-aware 
database 
 
Avoidance, 
Preventive 
 
X X 
 
Matching policies 
6. (Gunter et al., 
2004) 
AdLoc 
Combining formal access 
control with PDRM 
 
Avoidance,  
Preventive 
X X 
Matching 
policies/access 
control 
7. (Jiang et al., 
2002) 
Model: Approximate 
Information Flows   
The Principle of Minimum 
Asymmetry 
Prevention, 
Avoidance & 
Detection X X 
Detection, Feedback, 
Noise (Anonymity) 
8. (Lederer et al., 
2002) 
UI Metaphor: Situational 
faces metaphor – 
conceptualising end-user  
privacy preferences 
 
Preventive X X 
 
Matching Policies 
9. (AT&T, 2004) 
Find People Nearby 
Friend finding application Preventive X  Noise (cloaking) 
10. (Nguyen & 
Mynatt, 2002) 
Privacy Mirror 
UI Metaphor: Privacy 
Interface (for feedback and 
detection) 
 
 
Detection 
 X 
 
Feedback 
 
 
Table 4: Results of Modified Heuristic Walkthrough (actual and average score per 
model per heuristic) 
Model 1 
(EU GSM 
Phone) 
Model 2 
(Confab) 
Model 3 
(Extended 
Confab) Heuristic 
Actual Avg Actual Avg Actual Avg 
Visibility of system status  
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
4 
4 
4.3 
5 
5 
4 
4.7 
User control and freedom  
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
4.7 
Error prevention  
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3.3 
Flexibility and efficiency of use  
1 
2 
1 
1.3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Help users recognize, diagnose, 
and recover from errors 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
4 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Social Translucence  
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
4 
3 
4 
4 
5 
4.3 
 
  
 
Figure 1: Privacy Model 
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